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Systems Health Management (SHM) is one of three basic functionalities that constitute 
an autonomous capability of a system.  The other two functionalities are Planning & 
Scheduling, and Task Execution.  In an autonomous system, variable autonomy is often 
distinct from variable authority to sense, decide, and act.  There are quantifiable Levels of 
Autonomy that can be achieved by tuning different portions of the Observe-Orient-Decide-
Act loop to provide flexibility and control.  This approach is tabulated for multiple domains 
such as spacecraft and aerial vehicles.  Examining SHM through a Systems Thinking lens 
helps us understand its stocks and flows, loops, and delays.  Systems thinking, and modeling, 
is a useful way to understand change and complexity of systems of many types. There are 
certain archetypes that underlie well-known autonomy architectures. And there often are 
leverage points – best places to intervene in a system – that can resolve or mitigate some 
fundamental challenges in the design and deployment of autonomous systems.  I identify 
these levers and present the ones that have been successfully used in NASA missions.  
I. Introduction 
N an autonomous system, tunable autonomy arises from combinations of varying degrees of capability, and 
authority, to sense, decide, and act. I propose, in Table 1, quantifiable Autonomy Levels that are achieved by 
tuning different portions of the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act loop.   
 These levels are based on the Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) framework supported by the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology. ALFUS is a logical framework for characterizing autonomy for 
unmanned systems. It covers levels of autonomy, mission complexity, and environmental complexity. The 
Framework provides standard definitions, metrics, and process for the specification, evaluation, and development of 
the autonomous capabilities [6]. 
 
 
AL Descriptor Observe Orient Decide Act 
10 Full autonomy Aware of status of 
fleet-wide assets 
Autonomous fleet-
wide awareness 
Autonomous fleet 
coordination 
Group 
accomplishes all 
goals 
9 Swarm 
cognizance 
Sensors and models 
to infer intent of 
other vehicles 
Strategic group 
goals assigned, 
infers other vehicle 
intent 
Distributed tactical 
group planning, 
individual goal 
determination 
Group 
accomplishes 
strategic goals 
without assistance 
8 Space 
environment 
knowledge 
Proximity inference, 
reduced 
dependence on off-
board data 
Strategic group 
goals assigned 
Coordinated, tactical 
team planning, 
individual task 
planning 
Group 
accomplishes 
tactical goals with 
minimal operator 
assistance 
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7 Space 
environment 
sensing 
Short-track 
awareness, limited 
inference plus off-
board data 
Tactical group 
goals assigned, 
estimates other 
vehicle trajectory  
Individual task 
planning and 
execution 
Accomplishes 
tactical goal with 
ground monitoring 
6 Multi-vehicle 
cooperation 
Range awareness, 
communication with 
other vehicles 
Tactical group 
goals assigned, 
estimates other 
vehicle location 
Coordinated 
trajectory planning 
and execution 
Maintains close 
levels of separation 
5 Multi-vehicle 
coordination 
Local sensors to 
detect others, cloud 
communication 
Tactical group plan 
assigned, 
compensates for 
failures 
Onboard trajectory 
planning, optimize 
for current condition 
Avoids collisions 
4 Fault-adaptive 
vehicle 
Deliberate state 
awareness, 
communication with 
ground 
Tactical plan 
assigned, 
compensates for 
control failures 
Onboard trajectory 
planning, self-
manage resources 
Maintains medium 
levels of separation 
3 Scripted response 
to failures 
Health/status 
sensors, history, and 
models 
Real-time health 
diagnosis, adaptive 
inner-loop control 
Evaluates status for 
required mission; 
safe mode if needed 
Accomplishes 
tactical plan with 
assistance from 
operator 
2 Full automation 
for nominal 
operations 
Health/status 
sensors 
Real-time health 
monitoring, off-
board replanning 
Executes preloaded 
sequence or upload 
new sequence 
Executes original 
plan or new plan 
1 Limited 
automation 
Pre-loaded mission 
plan, spacecraft 
control, navigation 
sensing 
Pre- and post-flight 
BIT 
No deviation from 
pre-planned mission 
Executes pre-
planned mission 
sequence 
0 Remotely-
controlled 
Traditional mission 
control 
Downlinks data, 
responds to 
uplinked 
commands 
No onboard decisions Acts as commanded 
 
Table 1 Autonomy Levels Mapped to Autonomy Functions for Space Missions 
 
 
Future missions, such as for heliophysics, or lunar mobility/habitat will likely have a multi-craft architecture. 
Table 1 can help in the selection, and tuning, of portions of autonomous functionalities.  However, a simple 
smorgasbord-like selection could create a system with an unsustainable or a lopsided structure, and hence 
misidentify its behavior, utility, and outcomes.  
 
 
 
II. Identifying and Utilizing Leverage Points of a System 
Systems Thinking offers a way to map a system so that all stakeholders can see a system, agree on its current 
state, understand how its variables are linked and how its delays propagate. It facilitates a systemic inquiry into the 
underlying structure that can impact the system’s performance.  Systems thinking maps are a visual representation of 
our mental model of the dynamics present in the system. 
The core components of system maps are reinforcing and balancing causal loops.  Reinforcing loops are a series 
of links that amplify each other in a self-reinforcing process. They may exhibit patterns of runaway growth or 
decline.  Balancing loops are self-correcting processes. They may exhibit patterns of oscillation. Implicit in every 
balancing loop is a goal state that the system is trying to maintain. 
System Archetypes are configurations of reinforcing and balancing loops that determine the system’s behavior.  
There are intended and unintended consequences to every action. Archetypes help categorize and understand various 
interconnections, interplay, and relationships between elements in a system. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Systems Thinking: the Problem Archetype (left) and the Solution Archetype (right). 
 
Eric Wolstenholme [1] condenses system archetypes down to a more understandable core set of totally generic 
archetypes, consisting of the four ways of ordering a pair of reinforcing and balancing feedback loops. At the meta 
level, for every ‘‘problem’’ archetype he identifies a closed-loop ‘‘solution’’ archetype (Fig. 1).  
Donella Meadows’ influential article, Leverage Points: Places to Intervene in a System [2], was penned during a 
discussion of global trade treaties. The article identifies levers that can influence the outcome of a system.  These are 
points of high leverage where a small change can have a large impact.  
I map these leverage points to succinctly describe many aspects of defining, developing, and operating a 
spacecraft Fault Management (FM) system. The Top 12 Levers in Fault Management (in increasing order of 
effectiveness) are: 
A) Select Parameters 
B) Architect Buffers 
C) Leverage Redundancy 
D) Understand Lengths of Delays 
E) Choose the Right Level of Response for Fault Management 
F) Ride the Implementation Wave 
G) Visualize Information Flow 
H) Levy Requirements, Know Constraints 
I) Refine the Wheel (but don’t re-invent it) 
J) Set the Goals of Fault Management 
K) Acknowledge the Paradigm 
L) Transcend the Paradigm 
 
III. Leverage Points in the LADEE Fault Management System 
The Lunar Atmosphere and Dust Environment Explorer (LADEE) spacecraft is a small orbiter, category II, 
enhanced Class D spacecraft built on a modular common bus architecture. It achieved its science goal to examine 
the structure and composition of the tenuous atmosphere of the Moon and to understand its dust distribution.  
During the design phase LADEE’s low-cost, single-string “common bus” backbone challenged the scope of its 
Fault Management system. The team relied on model-based tools to design command sequences, understand the 
consequence of an unexpected reboot, and test various strategies for ground controller intervention and override. 
This section discusses how to use Systems Thinking’s leverage points to design an FM system to enable a 
successful mission.  
A. Select Parameters 
Start with an exploration of how many state variables to monitor. These may be determined by sensor placement 
and coverage, and might be restricted by available compute cycles and memory.  Then select which state variables 
to monitor, such as spacecraft body rates, propellant tank pressure, subsystem temperature, bus voltage. 
Set thresholds and tune them. Set upper and lower bounds for at least two limit bands for each variable: red 
limits and yellow limits. These may be set by Subsystem Designers or Mission Operators, based on prior experience, 
or may be based on vendor recommendations. Setting sampling rates for onboard use (based on available storage) 
and for downlink (constrained by packet size). 
B. Architect Buffers 
In systems there are items that you can track, count, or measure at any point in time. These are referred to as 
levels or accumulations. These are affected by repeated behaviors or actions which result in inflows, and outflows. 
Assess the FM data flow: will it be like a lake or like a river? Do consider using the stabilizing effect of buffers. 
Be sure to select right-sized buffering. If a buffer is too big, the system becomes inflexible. If too small, the system 
gets starved. 
It is useful to identify and understand trade-offs between desired “ilities” of your architecture.  Examples of such 
attributes, alphabetically arranged, are: 
Accessibility; Availability 
Capacity; Certifiability; Compatibility 
Dependability 
Effectiveness; Efficiency 
Maintainability; Modifiability 
Operability 
Portability 
Quality 
Recoverability; Reliability; Resilience; Response time; Reusability; Robustness 
Safety; Scalability; Security; Stability; Supportability 
Testability; Transparency; Trustability 
Usability 
Versatility 
C. Leverage Redundancy 
 Some spacecraft missions have the luxury of multiple redundant subsystems. A backup can be deployed if 
the primary subsystem, or a component, fails. For instance the fault protection on the Cassini mission [7] had to be 
robust so that no credible single point failure prevents attainment of the objectives, or results in a significantly 
degraded mission. Exemptions (Fig. 2) were granted for items whose failure probability was low due to the presence 
of large design margins. Adequate physical redundancy was provided with four reaction wheels for 3-axis control, 
three RTGs, and two main engines. 
For tighter mass budgets, such as on LADEE, the engineer must leverage dissimilar functional redundancies. 
Identify alternate-use options, and identify all single point failures. Design the layout to match the redundancy. For 
instance, select whether to use a single, full-length harness or to use a split harness to connect the subsystems. 
 Estimate how many spares to create and store – for example the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) [3] set 
included spare Transponder, Diplexers, Band Reject Filter, 6-dB Couplers, RF Transfer Switches. 
 
 
SPF# Cassini Single Point Failures (Exemption List) 
1 Loss of a Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator 
2 Loss of 1 High Gain Antenna (HGA), or either Low Gain Antenna (LGA 1 , LGA 2) inside 1.5 AU 
3 Leakage or bursting of a propulsion module tank (pressurant tank, main engine oxidizer tank, main engine fuel tank, thruster) 
4 External leakage or bursting of propulsion module fluid or pressurant lines and fittings… 
5 Structure (Spacecraft adapter, orbiter, or Probe) 
6 Spacecraft separation band (retention / release) 
7 Thermal blankets, surfaces, and shields (spacecraft and probe) 
8 Spacecraft cabling short 
9 Selected command and data errors 
10 Main engine combustion chamber (catastrophic explosion) 
11 Passive radio frequency equipment 
12 Micrometeoroid shielding (inherent or specific) 
13 Power interruption greater than 37 milliseconds 
14-18 Probe adapter structures, Probe structure, spin-up and release mechanisms 
Fig. 2 Exempted Single-Point Failures for Cassini. 
D. Understand Lengths of Delays 
All systems have delays in them.  Delays are the “no feedback” zones of a system. To handle the delay of 
propagation of physical effects in a system use the “persistence” parameter of a state variable to determine whether 
it has crossed a pre-defined threshold limit.  This helps deal with sensor noise as well as with the effect propagation 
time. Relate this to sampling rate, and trade against threshold limits. Use timid or bold limits based on risk tolerance. 
Delays are accounted for by “wait” times, after power on, before using a component, or for a maneuver to 
complete (Fig. 3). 
 
 
Fig. 3  Representative Wait Times in a Lunar Mission 
E. Choose the Right Level of Response for Fault Management 
 
It is acceptable to not design automated responses to all failure conditions – sometimes “no response” is the right 
response for very low probability or very low severity failures.  Most spacecraft, however, at least downlink simple 
telemetry to let the ground operator know the state of the spacecraft. This downlinked data contains measurements, 
status flags, or incrementing counters.  The next level of automated response is to raise an event to notify operators. 
A common strategy for spacecraft fault management is to execute an automated command to go to Safe Mode. 
As discussed in [5] spacecraft modes encapsulate many operational intentions. They define the feedback and 
actuators to control the spacecraft, and they provide a single command to switch between these mechanisms. In any 
particular mode (Fig. 4) the spacecraft can, in a pre-set way, automatically turn components on/off.  Mode 
definitions, transition restrictions, and transition pathways often lead to lively debates between different design 
teams. For instance, there can be multiple options for the path to Safe Mode: with or without processor reboot. 
 
 
 
Fig. 4  Commanded (black) or Autonomous (red) Mode Transitions on LADEE 
  
Further levels of corrective actions include sending a direct command from ground to recover from Safe 
Mode. Several missions have had to upload a new command sequence from the ground.  If that does not resolve 
the issue, the next level of remediation involves uploading a new flight software load. 
F. Ride the Implementation Wave 
 Leverage existing flight software (FSW) modules for FM functionality (Fig. 5). Leverage FSW for FM 
“failure injection” capability. Strive to “test like you fly” as best possible without risk of damaging the spacecraft by 
“injecting failures” into a software or a hardware simulator rather than the actual spacecraft. Address telemetry 
needs and command capabilities for Mission Operators, and data needs for Science Operations. 
 
 
Fig. 5  LADEE Flight Software Architecture 
G. Visualize Information Flow 
Practice FM with Mission-Operations-in-the-loop (Fig. 6), to understand the right quantity, quality, and speed of 
information that needs to flow to the human operator.  
 
 
 
Fig. 6  Identifying Information Flow for LADEE Fault Management 
H. Levy Requirements, Know Constraints 
FM levies requirements on Flight Software, and vice versa – earlier the better! Additionally, FM levies 
requirements on itself – such as “do no harm”. FM levies requirements on Mission Operations, and vice versa – 
iterate this along with first draft of Ops Concept. 
FM often levies requirements on Science Operations. This may depend on the scope of FM under the constraints 
of CPU, memory, available spacecraft resources for continued operation such as power, propellant, pressurant, 
coolant. 
An often underestimated constraint is the time available to design, implement, debug and verify FSW. 
Verification, alone, can take up to an hour per requirement on a medium-sized mission.  This can be reduced 
through model-based development of software. 
I. Refine the Wheel (but don’t re-invent it) 
Leverage lessons learned from similar NASA missions to design out the known issues and to be better informed 
about responding to spacecraft failures. For instance, the Kepler mission underwent multiple safing events, from 
false positives due to sensor noise (reference). Curiosity (Mars Science Laboratory) had unexpected computer resets, 
for which the underlying cause was a processor bug. Likewise, LRO had an operating system bug (two differing 
implementations of fmod function). 
Capture this process knowledge to help future missions. For instance the Cassini fault protection had to be 
redesigned [8] from its original form [7]. One month after Cassini’s launch when the propellant tanks were 
pressurized for the first time, the prime regulator was leaking at a rate significant enough to require a considerable 
change. This occurrence of new failure modes required design changes in thresholding algorithms. 
Be aware that heritage can be a double-edged sword. Seek consensus on what to conserve and retain from a 
previous system. 
J. Set the Goals of Fault Management 
Implement an operational capability to detect and respond to conditions that interfere with nominal operations. 
Maintain a capability to continue to operate through critical events. That is, develop a capability to “fail 
operational”. 
Provide a common context for subsystem designers to verbalize “what can go wrong”, especially at interfaces, 
and during mode- or phase-transitions [5]. Coordinate, design, and implement Fault Management by leveraging, 
where possible, existing Flight Software modules. 
K. Acknowledge the Paradigm 
A paradigm is a set of beliefs, cultivated over time, about how a mission or a project should be designed and 
implemented. A key factor is a project’s risk posture based on mission risk classification.   
Encourage Project commitment to the importance of early involvement of fault management. Start in the 
formulation phase (Phase A) to dampen the ubiquitous “workload bump” in the implementation phase (Phase D). 
Strive for a buy-in from subsystems – this is hard!  Many subsystem leads are certain that they have a perfect 
system.  Their paradigm is to design the nominal system first. And they may see fault management capability simply 
as some additional software that can be folded in later.  
L. Transcend the Paradigm 
Earn the buy-in from subsystem leads through active listening. Start with a scenario-based discussion of 
potential failures in the subsystems, assess their likelihood and severity, and then flow these scenarios back into 
detailed requirements. The sooner a subsystem’s failure handling requirements are implemented in software, the 
sooner the subsystem team gets to “try it out” in simulation – including a failure simulation. 
Establish “certifiable trust” in system performance that cannot be anticipated from behavior of individual 
subsystems. This is especially valuable for responding to subtle failures during critical events [4]. 
As system complexity grows acknowledge that fault management may not scale elegantly. There may be a need 
to develop a flexible, autonomous control architecture with goal-driven adaptability to operate under all conditions. 
IV. Conclusion 
This is an initial exploration of a Systems Thinking perspective on Fault Management.  The next effort needs to 
focus on system archetypes that help, or hinder, the development of effective fault management for NASA missions.  
Particularly, as more autonomy is introduced into the space and air vehicles of tomorrow, there is going to be a 
stronger need to understand old paradigms and their constraints. To infuse new ways of implementing bolder 
missions there needs to be a way of understanding system archetypes and how to overcome their limitations.    
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